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The facts and the High Court judgment
This case will impact constitutional law, constitutional interpretation, and electoral law in the
sense that it will likely remain for a long time the leading case on independent candidates in
South Africa. With the decision in New Nation Movement NPC v President of the Republic of
South Africa (hereinafter referred to as ‘NNM’), 2 the Constitutional Court has enabled South
Africa to join nations like Namibia in permitting independent candidates.
In late 2018, five persons instituted an urgent application at Western Cape division of the High
Court. In their application, New Nations Movement NPC, Ms. Chantal Dawn Revell, GRO,
Indigenous First Nation Advocacy SA PBO, and the Mediation Foundation for Peace and
Justice NPC cited four persons as respondents, namely the President of the Republic, the
Speaker of the National Assembly, the Minister of Home Affairs, and the Electoral
Commission.
The applicants argued that the Electoral Act violates section 19(3)(b) of the Constitution for
unjustifiably limiting the right to stand for public office and, if elected, to hold office. Some of
the applicants also submitted that the Electoral Act infringed their right to freedom of
association, enshrined in section 18 of the Constitution.
The Cape Town-based court dismissed the application, ruling that nowhere in section 19(3)(b)
of the Constitution does it provide for the right to stand office as an independent candidate, as
opposed to a member of a political party. 3 The court held that other provisions of the
Constitution belie the applicants’ argument, for example, those relating to South Africa’s
‘multi-party system’ (section 1(d)) and to the discretion of Parliament to prescribe – through
national legislation – the electoral system that applies to the National Assembly and the
provincial legislatures (sections 46(1)(a) and 105(1)(a)).
Desai J quoted with approval Majola v State President of the Republic of South Africa, 4 which
dealt with almost identical facts and which observed that section 1(d)(on the ‘multi-party
system) entrenched a party system in South Africa. 5 Perhaps more importantly, the judge in
NNM leaned on the Constitutional Court judgment in Ramakatsa v Magashule, 6 to claim that
section 19 ‘locates political parties at the centre of political rights’. 7
Desai J also relied on the Constitutional Court judgment in New National Party of South Africa
v Government of the Republic of South Africa 8 to hold that ‘the mere existence of the right to
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vote without proper arrangements for its effective exercise does nothing for a democracy, it is
both empty and useless’. 9 He noted that, apparently, no legislative framework existed to
facilitate independent members standing for election. However, Desai J distinguished the NNM
case from the Constitutional Court judgment in My Vote Counts NPC v Minister of Justice and
Correctional Services, in which Mogoeng CJ read section 19 as meaning that ‘every adult
citizen may in terms of the Constitution stand as an independent candidate to be elected to
municipalities, provincial legislatures or the National Assembly’. 10 Desai J treated Mogoeng’s
holding as a ‘remark’ and as ‘obiter’ that, accordingly, did not bind the High Court. 11
Crucially, Desai J found that, at best for the applicants, the Constitution does not proscribe a
system which permits independents to run. 12 The Constitution permits Parliament to choose
between allowing independents to run at national and provincial levels, and only allowing them
to run at local level. 13 Once Parliament has made the choice, that choice does not violate the
Constitution.14 For that reason and those mentioned above, Desai J dismissed the applicants’
case. 15
The decision of the Constitutional Court
Except for the Mediation Foundation for Peace and Justice NPC, 16 the applicants sought leave
to appeal to the Constitutional Court against Desai J’s High Court decision. The Constitutional
Court resolved the independent candidate question in the applicants’ favour. Though
Froneman J dissented, the majority judgment, penned by Madlanga J, accepted the applicants’
arguments that the Electoral Act violated the right to vote (section 19), the right to freedom of
association (section 18), the right to dignity, and freedom of conscience. 17
Before delving into the specific rulings of the court’s majority, a recital of how the Constitution
provides for the right to vote, the right to freedom of association, and the multi-party system
appears apposite. Section 19 of the Constitution lays down that:
Every citizen is free to make political choices, which includes the right —
(a) to form a political party;
(b) to participate in the activities of, or recruit members for, a political party; and
(c) to campaign for a political party or cause.
For its part, Section 18 stipulates that ‘[e]veryone has the right to freedom of association’.
In addition, Section 1(d) of the Constitution defines South Africa as a sovereign, democratic
state founded on ‘[u]niversal adult suffrage, a national common voter’s roll, regular elections
and a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness
and openness’. 18
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Writing for the majority, 19 Madlanga J held that, in essence, section 19 of the Constitution gave
the right to South Africans to stand for public office as independent candidates.
Both Madlanga and Jafta recognized that the Constitution and the Electoral Act did not
expressly provide for the right of individuals to run for political office as independent
candidates. However, they insisted that the principle of harmonious interpretation demands that
judges construe the Constitution in such a manner as not to offend other rights provided for in
the Constitution, including especially the right to vote in Section 19 and the right to freedom
of association in Section 18. 20
By adopting the principle of harmonious interpretation, the majority of the judges held that the
applicants had the right to run for office as independent candidates, even if the Constitution
and the Electoral Act did not provide for independent candidacy.
In coming up with that conclusion, Madlanga J noted that, at the very least, the silence about
independent candidates in the Constitution and the Electoral Act meant that they both did not
prohibit or allow those candidates. Still, in order to avoid contravening the freedom of
association, these provisions had to be read as obliging the state to allow independent
candidates to run for office.
Madlanga J reasoned that freedom of association entails the freedom of every individual to
choose whomsoever they wish to associate with and their freedom to choose with whom not to
associate – i.e., a negative right to freedom of association. In particular, Madlanga J recalled
that Article 10 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights specifically provides for
the negative right to freedom of association: 21 ‘No one may be compelled to join an
association.’ 22
Freedom of association entails the duty of the state to allow the freedom not to associate with
others in a political party. 23 With that definition in mind, forcing individuals to join political
parties in order to run for office would violate the constitutionally protected right to freedom
of association.
Froneman J dissented from the majority opinion of his brethren. He contended that to conclude
that a harmonious interpretation of the Constitution would inevitably lead to an acceptance of
independent candidates was flawed. He said that section 19 of the Constitution was neither
prescriptive nor permissive, which meant that prescribing independent candidacy involves
necessarily a lapse in logic. The proper logical reasoning would lead one to conclude that
whether legislation authorizes or proscribes independent candidacy is not something that the
Constitution decides.
Rather, according to Froneman J, the best solution would be to rule that the decision as to
whether to allow independent candidates is best left to Parliament. Echoing Desai J in the court
below, Froneman J recalled that, in an earlier case, the Constitutional Court itself accepted the
principle that the electoral system is decided and designed by Parliament. Relying on that
principle, he inferred that the Constitution’s silence on whether to allow independent candidacy
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does not mean that it accepts independent candidacy to avoid a tension with the freedom of
association.
Froneman J, in the end, held that he would have dismissed the applicants’ appeal on the basis
that Parliament, and not the courts, should decide on the electoral system and, especially, on
whether no-party representation or independent candidacy should take place in South Africa.
Significance of the judgment
This case will impact constitutional law, constitutional interpretation, and electoral law in the
sense that it will likely remain for a long time the leading case on independent candidates in
South Africa. This is an important question that has also been raised elsewhere, like it did
recently in Namibia. In both South Africa and Namibia, the question was raised as to the
desirability of independent candidates. With the decision in NNM, the Constitutional Court has
enabled South Africa to join nations like Namibia in permitting independent candidates.
Indeed, in the latest presidential elections in Namibia, independent candidates, such as
Panduleni Itula, successfully ran and even managed to make the long-time ruling party
SWAPO to lose its super-majority in Parliament.
However, in South Africa and Namibia, just as in the United States, the question of whether
independent candidates should run for political office does not only involve questions of law.
In a very practical manner, it is a question that calls for the economics of running for political
office. While Froneman J relies on logic, I rely on economics or economic logic.
Allowing everyone to run for political office can drain the resources at the state’s disposal to
organize and monitor elections. In particular, if the state allows everyone to run, this could lead
to an influx of candidates and chancers to run for office, which may overwhelm the body tasked
with the organization of election. So the real limitation to independent candidacy could be
economic, in that the ability to inscribe all hopefuls on the ballots will be hugely curtailed. For
instance, because of the high number of candidates, countries like the DRC had to produce
ballots that ran over several pages.
It may be more sensible for Parliament or for the law in general for candidates, whether
independent or institutional, to post bail in order to signal their commitment and seriousness to
run for office, as opposed to a situation where virtually anybody who can write his or her name
on a form can run for office and thus flood electoral offices.
So I agree with Froneman that the matter will be best left to Parliament, not because judges do
not have the cognitive ability to do it, but because members of Parliament have more resources
and more time to think about the best possible design of South Africa’s electoral system.
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